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NOTES
and not the name of the security. The Louisiana courts have not
been consistent in dealing with building and loan stock. In two
instances the Uniform Stock Transfer Act was held applicable
to the transfer of building and loan shares ;16 however, in two
other cases it was held that an association shareholder was a
creditor of the association, and that upon the death of the share-
holder the administrator of his estate was entitled to withdraw
the value of the shares from the association. 17 Followed to its
logical conclusion the decisions holding that association stock is
regulated by the Uniform Stock Transfer Act' would definitely
characterize association stock as ordinary corporation stock,
which is the object of a perfect usufruct. That act regulates the
transfer of corporate stock, while the transfer of negotiable in-
struments, which are evidences of debt, is regulated by the Ne-
gotiable Instruments Law.19 A different result may be reached
by reasoning from the two decisions in which Louisiana courts
have classified association stockholders as creditors of the asso-
ciation. Those two decisions, viewed in the light of the many
decisions in which the courts have classified other evidences of
indebtedness as being the objects of an imperfect usufructj2 are
strong reason to presume that when the Supreme Court is
squarely faced with the problem, it will classify building and
loan stock as being the object of an imperfect usufruct.
Bernard Kramer
CORPORATIONS - RIGHT OF A STOCKHOLDER TO INSPECT THE
CORPORATE BOOKS
In Louisiana the stockholder of a business corporation is
granted the right to inspect the books of the corporation in which
16. Lilley v. First Federal Sav. & Loan Assn., 194 So. 901 (La. App. 1940) ;
State em rel. Moulin v. Ideal Sav. & Homestead Assn., 178 So. 521 (La. App.
1938).
17. Dimitry v. Shreveport Mut. Bldg. Assn., 167 La. 875, 120 So. 581 (1929);
Succession of D'Anna, 6 La. App. 142 (1927).
18. LA. R.S. 12:521 et seq. (1950) (The Louisiana Uniform Stock Transfer
Act).
19. LA. R.S. 7:1 et seq. (1950) (The Louisiana Negotiable Instruments Law).
20. Taylor v. Taylor, 189 La. 1084, 1091, 181 So. 543, 544 (1938) : ("Since
the estate of the decedent consisted of negotiable bonds payable to bearer, the
usufruct is an imperfect one.") ; Vivian State Bank v. Thompson-Lewis Lbr. Co.,
162 La. 660, 111 So. 51 (1927) (time certificate of deposit held to be the object
of an imperfect usufruct) ; Succession of Block, 137 La. 302, 68 So. 618 (1915)
(notes); Minquez v. Delcambre, 125 La. 176, 51 So. 108 (1910) (negotiable
promissory notes held to be the objects of an imperfect usufruct, but notes were
matured) ; Johnson v. Bolt, 146 So. 375 (La. App. 1933) (promissory notes held
to be the object of an imperfect usufruct). For a complete discussion of the clas-
sification of promissory notes as being the object of an imperfect usufruct, see
Comment, 4 TUL. L. REV. 104 (1929).
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he has invested." Whether or not this right can be waived in
advance of the stockholder's demand to inspect has apparently
never been decided, 2 but the problem was suggested by a recent
case.8
A corporation is required by the Constitution to keep avail-
able for public inspection its books showing the amount of cap-
ital stock subscribed, the names of owners of stock, the amount
owned by them respectively, the amount of said stock paid, and
by whom, the transfers of said stock, with the date of transfer,
the amount of its assets and liabilities and the names and ad-
dresses of its officers.4 This provision imposes on the corpora-
tion a constitutional duty of which it cannot be relieved by con-
tract with an individual. Section 38E of the Corporation Act
grants a much wider right of inspection to shareholders who
meet its requirements as to the percentage of stock held. The
statute applies to "any and all of the books and records of the
corporation,"8' rather than to certain named ones as in the con-
stitutional provision. Is this shareholder's right of inspection
one which he may waive by agreement with the corporation, or
is it a fundamental right which is inherent in the shareholder
status under the Louisiana Corporation Act? The answer to this
question is a matter of basic statutory construction. The cor-
poration is a creature of statute and is subject to all mandatory
1. LA. R.S. 12:38E (1950). A general right of inspection of certain cor-
porate books is given by LA. CONST. art. XIII, § 4. The right of a stockholder to
inspect the corporate books was also recognized by the early Louisiana juris-
prudence. Martin v. Bienville Oil Works Co., 28 La. Ann. 204 (1876) ; Cockburn
v. Union Bank, 13 La. Ann. 289 (1858).
2. In this context waiver is simply a matter of contract. For a discussion of
various aspects of waiver, see EWART, WAIVER DISTRIBUTED C. 6 (1917).
3. State ex rel. Wolfner v. Fairfax Shipside Storage, 93 So.2d 336 (La. App.
1957). In the Fairfao case, the plaintiff was issued certain shares of stock in
the defendant corporation. These shares were created by amendment to the cor-
porate charter which provided that this stock was "without any right or privilege
to participate or vote in the affairs, conduct or management of this corporation."
When the plaintiff sought to inspect the books of the defendant corporation, the
defendant refused on the ground that the plaintiff, by accepting the non-partici-
pating stock, had waived his right to inspect. The Orleans Court of Appeal af-
firmed the trial court's granting to the plaintiff the right to inspect the corpora-
tion's books. The court held that a waiver of the stockholder's right to inspect,
assuming without deciding that there can be such a waiver, must be unequivocal,
and the conditions under which the plaintiff accepted the stock did not create a
waiver either directly or by compelling inference.
This topic note is not designed to treat the problem of whether a stockholder
may contract with the transferee of stock that the latter shall not exercise the
right of inspection. It only deals with the stockholder and a contract with the
corporation.
4. LA. CONST. art. XIII, § 4.
5. LA. R.S. 12:38E (1950).
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limitations of the law under which it is created.6 Examination
of the Business Corporation Act will reveal provisions granting
specific permission to deviate from certain of its stipulations.
For example, every shareholder shall have preemptive rights,
unless the articles provide otherwise ;7 also, every shareholder
shall have one vote for every share standing in his name, unless
the articles provide otherwise.8 Section 38E specifically grants
the right of inspection to the shareholder and does not state
that the articles may provide otherwise. Therefore, it would
seem that the legislative intent was that the right to inspect the
corporate books may not be abrogated by the articles or by-laws
of the corporation. Similarly, the officers of a corporation
should not be able to achieve this result indirectly by means of a
series of agreements between the corporation and the individual
shareholders. The officers are authorized to act only in accord-
ance with the corporate charter and by-laws, and the Corpora-
tion Act.9
There is also the broader ground, based simply on public
policy, by which the court could further justify denial to the
corporation of the power to abridge the shareholder's right of
inspection. Corporations, though they have the capacity of nat-
ural persons, are restricted in their authority to contract. 10 A
natural person contracts where not forbidden, but a corporation
contracts only within its authority." This distinction reflects a
willingness on the part of the legislature to restrict corporate
activity. Therefore, when the possibilities of fraud resulting
from waiver of the statutory right of inspection are weighed
against a corporation's freedom of contract, the latter element
is not so compelling as when it is a matter of abridging the in-
dividual's freedom of contract. The corporate entity has long
been considered a privilege extended by the state, and subject
to such restrictions as the state may see fit to impose.' 2
From the foregoing analysis it is submitted that the statutory
and constitutional provisions for inspection reflect the law's
6. Id. 12:12A; Jones v. Shreveport Lodge, 221 La. 968, 60 So.2d 889 (1952).
7. LA. R.S. 12:28 (1950).
8. Id. 12:32A.
9. Id. 12:35C; Tichenor v. Dr. G. H. Tichenor Co., 161 So. 198 (La. App.
1935).
10. LA. R.S. 12:12A (1950) ; Milwaukee Trust Co. v. Germania Ins. Co., 106
La. 669, 31 So. 298 (1902).
11. Central Transportation Co. v. Pullman's Palace Car Co., 139 U.S. 24(1891) ; In re German Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Reeder, 253 Fed. 722 (7th Cir.
1918) ; Seibrecht v. New Orleans, 12 La. Ann. 496 (1857).
12. Milwaukee Trust Co. v. Germania Ins. Co., 106 La. 669, 31 So. 298 (1902).
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awareness of a fundamental right of a shareholder. To protect
this right the Corporation Act does not recognize any power to
change or modify it in the articles or by-laws, and it should logic-
ally follow that it cannot be indirectly abrogated by agreements
with the shareholders.
William L. McLeod, Jr.
CRIMINAL LAW - CRIMINAL INTENT OR KNOWLEDGE AS AN
ELEMENT OF UNLAWFUL POSSESSION UNDER THE
NARCOTICS LAW
In a prosecution for unlawful possession of a hypodermic
syringe and needle, the state introduced in evidence (for the
stated purpose of showing criminal intent and guilty knowledge)
a barbiturate found in the box along with the hypodermic in-
struments. When the defense subsequently attempted to intro-
duce evidence that defendant had never used the hypodermic
instruments for administering narcotics, the prosecution's objec-
tion was sustained on the ground that it was irrelevant and im-
material as defendant was not charged with possession of nar-
cotics. The statute defining the crime of unlawful possession of
hypodermic instruments' makes no mention of any requirement
of criminal intent or knowledge of any particular facts. On ap-
peal, held, conviction reversed. "Unlawful possession" neces-
sarily involves knowledge of the fact that one is possessing un-
lawfully, as well as knowledge of the criminal consequences
which one should reasonably anticipate therefrom. The refusal
of the trial judge to allow defendant to show that he was in "good
faith" and that "his intent was anything but that of violating the
law" deprived the defense of a substantial right. State v. Bird-
sell, 232 La. 725, 95 So.2d 290 (1957).
Article 11 of the Louisiana Criminal Code provides that "the
definitions of some crimes require a specific criminal intent,
while in others no intent is required," and that "some crimes con-
sist merely of criminal negligence that produces criminal con-
sequences."'2 In those crimes defined in the Criminal Code itself,
the mental element is clearly spelled out. Article 10 of the Code8
declares that criminal intent may be "general" or "specific" and
1. LA. R.S. 40:962 (1950).
2. Id. 14:11.
3. Id. 14:10.
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